Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reliability theory, philosophy: reliability theory is a theory about the occurrence of knowledge. It attempts to explain how subjects in some cases have knowledge, without being able to explain this knowledge for themselves and others. See also causal theory of knowledge, knowledge, regularity, unconscious._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Reliability Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 252 Reliability/knowledge/thinking/Millikan: Thesis: to know what I think is to have a program in me that can carry out the correct acts of identification, of the referents of my current thought-token. Gradual: how good I am is gradual and depends on my dexterity and reliability. This helps me when I know a lot about the object. Thereby, repititions of the name of the thing are earlier acts of identification, and thus more intensions that facilitate my access to the thing. Problem: these intensions themselves must also be reliable. >Intension. I 253 Intension/Millikan: the intensions which I have of an object must also have had occasion to be applied. For example, "My great grandfather on my father's side a hundred generations before me" is a definite description, but hardly tangible as an intension. Therefore it may be that I do not know what object I think of. >Description._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27